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THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT: AS
CONFLICT RAGES ON, THE UNITED STATES
V. NOSAL RULING PROVIDES EMPLOYERS
CLEAR GUIDANCE
Ryan E. Dosh
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2010, industrial espionage cost U.S. businesses more than
$250 billion.1 While this figure represents all forms of industrial
espionage, companies often neglect a class of perpetrators that would
be easy to foil: internal employee hackers.2 It is a common scenario
for employees, or soon-to-be-former employees, to download
sensitive business information in violation of corporate policy.3 Over
the past several years, employers aware of internal breaches have
taken legal action by filing state and federal claims against rogue
employees.4 One weapon in their arsenal is to claim a violation of the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA),5 the United States’ most
far-reaching computer statute.6 However, federal courts are greatly
conflicted over the scope of the CFAA: whether it only establishes
penalties for accessing information or if it is broad enough to include
the misuse of information.7 The Ninth Circuit created a circuit split
 J.D., May 2014, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. 2011, California Lutheran
University. A special thank you to my friends and family, and in particular, to my late father for
his unconditional support and guidance.
1. Insider Data Theft: When Good Employees Go Bad, SYMANTEC (Dec. 12, 2011),
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/insider-data-theft-when-good-employees-go-bad.
2. Id.
3. Leslie Paul Machado, Protecting Against Employee Theft, HUM. RESOURCES
EXECUTIVE ONLINE (July 12, 2010), http://www.hreonline.com/HRE/view/story.jhtml?id=
475264808&ss=machado.
4. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, WEC Carolina Energy Solutions, LLC v.
Miller, 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012) (No. 12-158), 2012 WL 5353899.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008).
6. See id.; Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94
MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1561 (2010).
7. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 8–9.
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with United States v. Nosal,8 holding that the CFAA only covers the
“unauthorized access” of computer information, not its misuse, as the
First, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits’ broad interpretations of
the CFAA have held.9 Thus, employers are stuck between an
employer-friendly interpretation of the CFAA and an employeefriendly interpretation, depending on which jurisdiction they are in.10
This Comment explores the federal circuit split over the
CFAA’s scope and its effect on employers looking to bring CFAA
claims against “rogue employees.” Part II explores the history of the
CFAA, its current posture, and the sections of the statute that are
most cited by employers bringing CFAA claims against former
employees. Part III analyzes the Ninth Circuit’s narrow interpretation
of the CFAA in its en banc holding in United States v. Nosal. Part IV
addresses the widening circuit split over the broad and narrow
interpretations of the CFAA, while Part V supports the argument that
a narrow interpretation should prevail. Part VI then offers advice for
employers hoping to preserve CFAA claims against rogue employees
and solutions for protecting sensitive business information. Part VII
concludes.
II. CFAA: HISTORY AND CURRENT POSTURE
Congress originally enacted the CFAA in 1984 to protect
government computers from unauthorized access and to combat
newly emerging, ever-increasing computer crimes.11 The CFAA was
the first federal statute to specifically address computer crimes.12
Originally a purely criminal statute, the CFAA was limited in
scope.13 The original version “criminalized only important federal
interest computer crimes”—those relating to national security
secrets, certain financial institutions, and government-owned and
-operated computers.14 However, over the past twenty-eight years
Congress has substantially expanded the statute in an attempt to keep
8. 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012).
9. Id. at 863.
10. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 6.
11. See Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-473, § 2102(a), 98 Stat. 2190, 2190–92 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006)).
12. See Kerr, supra note 6, at 1564.
13. See Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, supra note
11, at 2191.
14. Kerr, supra note 6, at 1561; see also Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act of 1984, supra note 11, at 2191.
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pace with the rapidly changing computerized world.15 The statute’s
scope now includes nearly every computer in the United States and
millions of computers abroad.16
The first significant amendment occurred in 1994, when
Congress added a private cause of action to the statute.17 In turn, the
1994 amendment gave any private party the right to “maintain a civil
action against . . . violator[s]” of the CFAA.18 Later, in 1996,
Congress expanded the CFAA’s scope again, by introducing the term
“protected computer.”19 The CFAA’s authority then extended to any
computer used by the government, by financial institutions, or in
interstate commerce or communication.20 Again, in 2001, Congress
extended the scope of the CFAA to include international
computers.21 Most recently, a 2008 amendment expanded the
definition of protected computers once again. The definition now
includes any computer used by a financial institution, by the United
States government, or by any computer used in or affecting foreign
and interstate commerce and communications.22 As one author
argued, “the CFAA [is] one of the most far-reaching criminal laws in
the United States Code,”23 due to our increasing dependency on an
internet-connected, computerized world.
As a result of the statute’s evolution and broad definitions,
private parties, especially employers, are bringing an increasing
number of CFAA claims in federal court.24 The statute permits a
“private party who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of
‘the statute’” to bring a federal civil cause of action against the
violator.25 Assuming the plaintiff can show damages of at least
15. Kerr, supra note 6, at 1563.
16. Id. at 1561.
17. Computer Abuse Amendments Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit.XXIX, 108 Stat.
2097.
18. Id. at 2098.
19. See Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, tit. II, 110 Stat. 3488, 3492.
20. Kerr, supra note 6, at 1567–68.
21. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272, 382–84 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 50 U.S.C.).
22. Identity Theft Enforcement and Restitution Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-326, § 207,
122 Stat. 3560, 3563 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B)).
23. See Kerr, supra note 6, at 1561.
24. Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, ‘Unauthorized Access' and the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=
1202473140814.
25. Id.
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$5,000 within any one-year period, a CFAA claim may be brought in
federal courts, which gain federal question jurisdiction under the
statute.26 Most claims brought under the statute are for unauthorized
access to a computer or for access beyond the user's authorization
level.27
Thus, employers most frequently claim a CFAA violation under
Section 1030(a)(2)28, against employees who “intentionally [access]
a computer without authorization or [exceed] authorized access, and
thereby [obtain] . . . information from any protected computer,”29 and
Section 1030(a)(4), against those who “knowingly and with intent to
defraud, [access] a protected computer without authorization, or
[exceed] authorized access, and by means of such conduct [further]
the intended fraud and [obtain] anything of value.”30 The statute
defines “exceeding authorized access” as “access[ing] a computer
with authorization and us[ing] such access to obtain or alter
information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to
obtain or alter.”31 However, the statute fails to define “without
authorization.”32 Therefore, the statute’s broad definition of a
“protected computer,” in conjunction with the lack of a clear
statutory definition for “authorization,” has left federal courts split as
to the scope and meaning of the CFAA.33
As federal courts continue to dispute the legislative intent
behind the CFAA and the statute’s scope, Congress continues to
propose legislation that is equally conflicted.34 What is certain is
Congress’ original intent to create a single statute to cover the field
of computer crime “rather than identify[] and amend[] every
potentially applicable statute affected by advances in computer
technology.”35 However, that does little to resolve a widening circuit
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(i)(I) (2006).
27. See Machado, supra note 3.
28. See LINDA K. STEVENS & JESI J. CARLSON, THE CFAA: NEW REMEDIES FOR EMPLOYEE
COMPUTER ABUSE 2 (2008), available at http://www.schiffhardin.com/binary/stevens_carlson
_ibj_0308.pdf.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (2008).
30. Id. § 1030(a)(4).
31. Id. § 1030 (e)(6).
32. See id. § 1030.
33. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4.
34. Erin Fuchs, The Law Used To Target Aaron Swartz Doesn’t Make Sense Anymore, BUS.
INSIDER (Jan. 20, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/computer-fraud-and-abuse-act-reform2013-1.
35. S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 5 (1996).
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split, nor does it help employers looking to “rein in rogue
employees.”36
III. UNITED STATES V. NOSAL
In Nosal, the Ninth Circuit narrowly construed the CFAA’s term
“exceeds authorized access” to not cover unauthorized disclosure or
fraudulent use of information, even if covered as prohibited conduct
by a company’s computer-use agreement.37 Instead, the Nosal court
stated that the CFAA only covers claims as to a computer’s access
and not the misuse of information obtained by such access.38 There,
the defendant, David Nosal, resigned from a major executive search
firm, Korn/Ferry, after over eight years of service.39 As part of his
departure from the firm, Nosal received $25,000 monthly
compensation and two lump sums of money in exchange for signing
a one-year non-compete agreement.40 However, Nosal left the firm
intending to start his own business with the help of current
Korn/Ferry employees.41 Nosal convinced two employees to
download company information from a confidential database and
transfer the information to him.42 The employees maintained valid
credentials granting them access to the information, but violated an
employee policy that forbade disclosing confidential information.43
The government charged Nosal with violating the CFAA by aiding
the employees in “exceeding authorized access” under Section
1030(a)(4).44 Nosal then challenged the CFAA claims, stating that
the statute only targets “hackers, not individuals who access a
computer with authorization but then misuse the information they
obtain by means of such access.”45
The Nosal majority found the purpose of the statute was to
“punish hacking” and not the misappropriation of trade secrets.46 The
36. WEC Carolina Energy Solutions, LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 207 (4th Cir. 2012).
37. United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2012).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 856.
40. Brief for the United States at 3, United States v. Nosal, 642 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 2010)
(No. 10-10038), aff’d en banc 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012), .
41. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 856.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 863.
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court reasoned that the CFAA’s text “limited violations of
restrictions on access to information, and not restrictions on its
use.”47 The court found that the CFAA’s principal purpose was to
target hackers, not to “allow private parties to manipulate their
computer-use agreements and personnel policies so as to turn
[employment] relationships into ones policed by the criminal law.”48
Considerably concerned with expanding the scope of a criminal
statute, the majority determined that the CFAA was not intended to
criminalize minor computer misuses in the workplace.49
The dissent in Nosal found that the statute’s purpose was to
prevent the stealing of valuable information, regardless of who was
the culprit.50 Significantly, however, the dissent acknowledged that
this contested portion of the statute might be unconstitutionally
vague.51 The Nosal court’s holding created a clear circuit split
between the narrow interpretation penned by Judge Kozinski and the
broad interpretation taken by several other federal circuits.52
IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: WIDENING CIRCUIT SPLIT
A widening circuit split has evolved over the interpretation of
the CFAA’s terms “without authorization” and “exceeds authorized
access.”53 The Fourth Circuit recently complicated the circuit split by
aligning with the Ninth Circuit’s narrow interpretation of the CFAA
in Nosal, in contrast with the First, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh
Circuits’ broad interpretation.54 The conflict particularly revolves
around employer-employee relationships and confidential database
misuse.55 The meaning of the term “authorized” (or, put another way,
“without or exceeds authorization”) sits at the core of the
disagreement.56

47. Id. at 864.
48. Id. at 860.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 865.
51. Id. at 866.
52. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 6.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Ryan Patrick Murray, Myspace-ing Is Not a Crime: Why Breaching Terms of Service
Agreements Should Not Implicate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 29 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV.
475, 480–81 (2009).
56. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., United States v. Nosal: Rebooting the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act, 8 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 257, 270–71 (2012).
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A. Broad Interpretation: Employee Liability
The First,57 Fifth,58 Seventh,59 and Eleventh60 Circuits adopted a
broad interpretation of the CFAA, which holds employees who are
authorized to access a computer liable for using that access to steal or
damage company data in violation of a computer-use policy.61 The
circuits that adopted a broad interpretation rely on one of two modes
of analysis when defining the “without authorization” and “exceeds
authorized access” language.62 The first approach is based on a
common law agency theory, and the second approach is based on
mere violation of a computer use agreement and rooted in contract
theory.63 Under the broad interpretation, both modes of reasoning are
employer-friendly and determine that “without authorization” and
“exceeds authorized access” extend to misuse of information, rather
than just the access to it.64
In International Airport Centers, L.L.C. v. Citrin,65 the Seventh
Circuit held that “an employee’s authorization to access his
employer’s computer terminates when the employee uses the
computer contrary to the employer’s interests, thereby breaching his
duty of loyalty to his employer” and violating the CFAA.66 Citrin
decided to start his own company, but before resigning, engaged in
improper conduct by taking his employer’s marketing data for
corporate mergers and permanently deleted the employer’s only copy
of the files.67 Applying an agency theory, the court reasoned that
when Citrin breached his duty of loyalty, his authorization to access
the employer’s data terminated.68 Therefore, Citrin had accessed the
computer “without authorization,” in violation of the CFAA.69
The First, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits all recognize that an
57. EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001).
58. United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010).
59. Int’l Airport Centers, LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006).
60. United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010).
61. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 8.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 10.
64. Pamela Taylor, To Steal or Not to Steal: An Analysis of the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act and Its Effect on Employers, 49 HOUS. L. REV. 201, 203 (2012).
65. 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006).
66. Id. at 420–21; see Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 7.
67. Complaint at 4, Int’l Airport Centers LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006) (No.
03C 8104).
68. Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420–21.
69. Id.
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employee’s authority to access information is properly defined by a
company’s computer usage policy, and that violating such a policy
can serve as a basis for holding an employee liable under the
CFAA.70 These circuits reason that “an employee ‘exceeds
authorized access’ by violating employer-imposed restrictions on the
purpose for which computer-stored information may be obtained.”71
In EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc.,72 the First Circuit
held that an employment agreement can establish the parameters of
“authorized” access.73 There, as part of an employment agreement,
the employee signed a broad confidentiality agreement that he
violated when he attempted to “mine” his former employer’s
website.74 The Fifth Circuit’s holding in United States v. John75 takes
the First Circuit’s reasoning a step further. There, the court
summarized the First Circuit, stating that “an employment agreement
can establish the parameters of ‘authorized’ access” and thus
determined that “the concept of ‘exceeds authorized access’ may
include exceeding the purposes for which access is ‘authorized.’”76
The employee in John used her valid credentials to access company
information, removed highly sensitive and confidential information,
and ultimately used it to perpetrate fraud.77 The Fifth Circuit found
the employee accessed the information in violation of her employer’s
employee policies, and knew the purpose for accessing the
information was not “authorized.”78 Thus, the employee was found
to be in violation of the CFAA.79 Lastly, in United States v.
Rodriguez,80 the Eleventh Circuit held that an employee exceeded
authorized access when he violated the employer’s policy by
obtaining information for a non-business purpose.81 Although the
defendant did not use the information to further another crime, the
court found a violation of the CFAA.82
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4, at 9.
Id. at 9–10.
274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001).
Id. at 581–82.
Id. at 582–83.
597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 272.
Id. at 271–72.
Id.
Id.
628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1265.
Id. at 1260.
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The First, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits’ broad
definitions of “without authorization” and “exceeds authorized
access” provide employers federal recourse against an employee for
the misuse of electronic data.83 Therefore, in these circuits, any
violation of a company’s computer-use policy invites civil and
criminal liability to employees.84
B. Narrow Interpretation: Employers Beware
In United States v. Nosal, the Ninth Circuit held that the CFAA
does not cover employee-hackers or insiders who take data from
their employers and use it in an anticompetitive manner after leaving
the company.85 Three months later, the Fourth Circuit agreed with
the Ninth Circuit in WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller,86
holding that the CFAA is not violated when a former employee who
received authorization to obtain or alter data when he or she was
employed later misuses that information.87 The Fourth Circuit found
that the CFAA prohibits only hacking and does not extend to
misuse.88
Similar to the Ninth Circuit in Nosal, the Fourth Circuit in WEC
adopted a narrow reading of the CFAA and held that the statute
applies “only when an individual accesses a computer without
permission or obtains and alters information on a computer beyond
that which he is authorized to access.”89 There, a WEC employee
took computer data in violation of corporate policy, resigned and
started working for a competitor, and then used WEC’s data to pitch
a project to a customer.90 The court reasoned that the CFAA’s
“without authorization” and “exceeds authorized access” language
means that one cannot gain admission to a computer without
approval or gain access to information outside the scope of approved

83. See Robert B. Milligan, Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Circuit Split Remain
Unresolved: United States Supreme Court Challenge Dismissed, TRADING SECRETS
(Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.tradesecretslaw.com/2013/01/articles/computer-fraud/computer-fraud
-and-abuse-act-circuit-remains-unresolved/.
84. See id.
85. United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2012).
86. 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012).
87. Id. at 207.
88. Id. at 206.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 202.
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access.91 As a result, the court declined to extend the CFAA’s scope
to include the improper use of information that was validly accessed
by the employee.92 As the CFAA is a criminal and civil statute, the
Fourth Circuit was concerned with extending the statute’s reach to
employees who simply failed to comply with a company’s computeruse policies.93
The Ninth and Fourth Circuits’ narrow interpretation of the
CFAA holds that the statute prevents only hacking, or unauthorized
access to a computer, and does not prohibit the misuse of such
information.94 The courts were concerned with extending a criminal
statute to include any computer-use agreement violations, however
trivial.95 Thus, employers are limited in what claims can be brought
against “rogue employees.”96
V. CLEAR STANDARD: NARROW INTERPRETATION
The narrow interpretation of the CFAA articulated in Nosal, and
recently supported by the Fourth Circuit, reserves the CFAA’s
principal purpose as an anti-hacking statute, not an expansive
misappropriation statute.97 Focusing on the plain language of the
statute, and considering the “rule of lenity” and the goal of
preventing suspected but not yet proven unauthorized access, a
narrow interpretation is grounded in a sound analysis.98 Additionally,
employers prevented from bringing CFAA claims are not without
recourse, as other legal remedies exist for misuse grievances.99 As
such, “without authorization” and “exceeds authorized access”
should be construed narrowly, either by the Supreme Court or by
Congress.
The Nosal court construed a limited definition of the terms
“without authorization” and “exceeds authorized access.”100
Ultimately, the term “authorize,” as used in “without authorization”
or “exceeds authorized access,” requires interpretation. The
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 204.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 205.
See id. at 207; United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2012).
WEC, 687 F.3d at 207.
Id.
See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 857.
See id. at 863.
See WEC, 687 F.3d at 207 n.4.
See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 863.
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dictionary defines authorize as, “to grant official permission for or
approval.”101 Authorize, then, must be read in conjunction with the
meaning of access: “to gain admission to.”102 Therefore, an employer
gives an employee permission to gain admission to a company
computer when an employer “authorizes” the employee’s “access.”
Thus, accessing a computer “without authorization” means to gain
admission to it without permission.103 Similarly, an employee
“exceeds authorized access” by using her approved admission to the
computer to obtain or alter information that falls outside the bounds
of her approved access.104 Both of these phrases deal with setting
boundaries and exceeding them. The statute fails to mention misuse,
and instead clearly addresses just the access of information.105
Specifically, as the WEC court held, neither term extends “to the
improper use of information validly accessed.”106 Instead, it is
limited solely to the access.
In contrast, circuits applying the broad interpretation of the
CFAA define “authorizes,” in terms of state-law principals
governing agency relationships.107 Therefore, employer authorization
hinges on whether an employee is acting in the best interest of the
employer or, conversely, in violation of an employment
agreement.108 Thus, employment agreements and computer-use
agreements drafted by employers arbitrarily determine when an
employee either “exceeds authorized access” or uses a computer
“without authorization,” by being without authority at certain
moments.109
Accordingly, employees are constantly accessing a computer
without authorization and then potentially misusing information.110
101. RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 139 (2nd ed. 2001); WEBSTER'S THIRD
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 146 (2002).
102. RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 139 (2nd ed. 2001).
103. See WEC, 687 F.3d at 206.
104. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 859.
105. See id.
106. WEC, 687 F.3d at 204.
107. See Larkin, supra note 56, at 272–273.
108. Matthew Kapitanyan, Beyond Wargames: How the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
Should Be Interpreted in the Employment Context, 7 I/S: J. L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 405, 423
(Winter 2012).
109. See Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Appellee
and Urging Affirmance at 1617, United States v. Nosal, 642 F.3d 781 (No. 10-10038), 2010 WL
6191781.
110. Brian Zemil, Federal Circuits Split on Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, LITIGATION
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Throughout a normal workday, employees can be found violating
employee computer-use agreements, simply through routine
behavior.111 Employees perform personal, non-work related activities
on corporate computers, from sending personal emails, to checking
sports scores, to filling in the occasional sudoku.112 What then
qualifies as a breach of the agreement, resulting in a CFAA
violation? The standard is arbitrary. If Congress wanted the statute to
capture those who misuse information they are otherwise entitled to
access, it would have done so clearly.113 The Nosal court rightly held
that it was implausible to think Congress intended to make a criminal
law so expansive.114 Instead, even if they have not settled on the
narrow interpretation, the courts should read an ambiguous statute, as
opposing viewpoints indicate, strictly.115
The narrow interpretation complies with the settled principle
that “ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be
resolved in favor of lenity.”116 The Supreme Court has held that a
statute with both civil and criminal applications must be construed
strictly.117 Statutory interpretation applied for criminal prosecution
will also be applied in a civil action.118 If there is any doubt as to
Congress’ intentions, “the lowest common denominator must
govern.”119 Therefore, if ambiguity exists, as it does, a narrow
interpretation should prevail. A broad interpretation could make
felons out of millions of unsuspecting people.120 The CFAA could
criminalize millions of employees for ordinary online behavior
without being on notice of what conduct is criminally punishable.121
Furthermore, employees will be subject to the employer’s

NEWS
(Apr. 14, 2010),
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/litigationnews/top_stories/041410
-federal-circuit-computer-fraud-abuse.html.
111. See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 860.
112. Id.
113. Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation in Support of DefendantAppellee’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 9–10, Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (No. 10-10038), 2011
WL 2617475.
114. See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 862–63.
115. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380 (2004).
116. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 863.
117. Clark, 543 U.S. at 380–81.
118. See Larkin, supra note 56, at 279.
119. Clark, 543 U.S. at 380.
120. See Larkin, supra note 56, at 270.
121. Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation Supporting the Appellee and
Urging Affirmance, supra note 109, at 17.
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definition of a criminal statute. Allowing a broad interpretation of
“authorize” delegates to a private party the power to define a federal
criminal statute.122 As the Nosal court observed, simply performing
any personal, non-work-related activity serves to violate computeruse agreements.123 Additionally, allowing the employer to define the
criminal statute by defining “unauthorized access” in the computer
use agreement leaves employees inadequately notified of what
conduct is criminally punishable at any given time.124 Employee
agreements and computer-use policies, which are privately created,
frequently go unread and may be altered without notice.125 While
minor misuse is far from stealing, a broad interpretation leaves the
CFAA open to arbitrary enforcement and subject to violation by
millions of employees on a daily basis.126
A narrow interpretation not only provides a clearer standard, but
also is “in accord with the initial spirit and purpose of the CFAA.”127
As the court in Nosal found, “If Congress meant to expand the scope
of criminal liability to everyone who uses a computer in violation of
computer-use restrictions—which may well include everyone who
uses a computer—we would expect it to use language better suited to
that purpose.”128 Instead, the purpose is to punish hacking—
the circumvention of technological access barriers—not
misappropriation.129 Thus, the United States Supreme Court or
Congress must take action to narrow private interpretation of the
CFAA's scope.
VI. EMPLOYERS: IMPLEMENT PROTECTION
While a circuit split and uncertainty of the CFAA’s scope
continue to rage on, employers need to take protective steps in
preserving their company data and potential CFAA claims.130
Employers, especially in the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, need to take
122. See Murray, supra note 55, at 486.
123. United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 862–63 (9th Cir. 2012).
124. Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation Supporting the Appellee and
Urging Affirmance, supra note 109, at 15–16.
125. Id. at 16.
126. See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 863.
127. Greg Pollaro, iBrief, Disloyal Computer Use and The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act:
Narrowing the Scope, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 12, 23 (2010).
128. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 857.
129. Id.
130. See Milligan, supra note 83.
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the necessary steps of establishing strict access guidelines and
multiple levels of password protection.131 While a narrow
interpretation restricts employers’ claims under the CFAA,
understanding the Circuits’ holdings allows for employers to position
themselves to potentially preserve their federal claims, and to better
protect their data.132
The first step is to establish strict access guidelines for
employees.133 While the Ninth and Fourth Circuits held that
computer-use agreements do not define when an employee lacks
authorization or exceeds authorized access, establishing clear access
guidelines can only help the company in a practical sense and
potentially strengthen CFAA claims.134 Clarifying what access is
permissible gives employees a better understanding of what
constitutes a violation, and helps a company establish a framework
for implementing protective measures.135 With data theft steadily on
the rise, rewriting access guidelines will force employers to address
the access issue and devise protective measures that effectively
prioritize different types of information.136 Additionally, those
jurisdictions that have not followed a narrow interpretation of the
CFAA will have further ammunition in maintaining a CFAA
claim.137
Once companies set more detailed access guidelines, they can
implement more restrictive access with the use of multiple levels of
passwords.138 This extensive password-protection approach has been
termed a “code-based” restriction by Professor Orin Kerr.139 Under
this approach, employers assign detailed clearance levels for
employees on a strict need-to-know basis.140 Employees will then
only be able to access data necessary for particular responsibilities,
limiting the risk of rogue employees retrieving confidential company
131. Taylor, supra note 64, at 226.
132. See id.
133. See Machado, supra note 3.
134. See id.; Taylor, supra note 64, at 227.
135. Carolyn M. Plump, Can the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Help Protect Your Business
Data?, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Dec. 9, 2009), http:www.law.com/jsp/pa/PubArticlePA.jsp?id=
1202436184535.
136. See Machado, supra note 3; Insider Data, supra note 1.
137. See Machado, supra note 3.
138. See David Rosen, Limiting Employee Liability Under the CFAA: A Code-Based
Approach to “Exceeds Authorized Access,” 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 737, 760 (2012).
139. Kerr, supra note 6, at 1572.
140. See id.
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data.141 Limited access allows employers to better monitor sensitive
business information.142 Furthermore, it will be clear when an
employee accesses information “without authorization” or “exceeds
authorized access.”143
The ultimate goal is to curtail the ease of internal “hacking” and
to protect sensitive business information.144 Even though a narrow
interpretation of the CFAA limits employers’ federal judicial
remedies, implementing restrictive-access measures strengthens data
protection, possibly CFAA claims, and if nothing else, state law
claims.145
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court recently dismissed a petition for Writ of
Certiorari intended to address the circuit split, leaving CFAA’s scope
dependent on which federal court reviews the claim.146 Additionally,
contradictory legislation proposed in Congress fails to clarify the
CFAA’s scope.147 Thus, the circuit split has no end in sight. The
First, Fifth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits broadly interpret the
CFAA; the Fourth and Ninth Circuits interpret it narrowly. Yet, in
terms of employer-employee relationships, a narrow interpretation
should prevail and employers should prepare for a Supreme Court
ruling confirming the Ninth Circuit’s approach. The Ninth Circuit’s
holding in United States v. Nosal is grounded in sound judicial
analysis and sets clear guidelines. Even though the conflict and
widening circuit split rages on, employers need to take steps to
protect sensitive business information in anticipation of a narrow
ruling.

141. See Rosen, supra note 138, at 761.
142. See Larkin, supra note 56, at 283–84.
143. See id.; Rosen, supra note 138, at 760–61.
144. Machado, supra note 3.
145. See Milligan, supra note 83.
146. WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013).
147. Milligan, supra note 83.
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